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I. INTRODUCTION
In a speech delivered in the early days of the Turkish Re-
public, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk declared: "Gentlemen and
Great Nation! Know it well that the Turkish Republic cannot be
a country of sheikhs, dervishes, disciples and lunatics. The cor-
rect road is the road of civilization."
1
Ataturk's declaration distills the Kemalist Revolution's
message at large: the Turkish Republic must make a decisive
break with its Islamic past in order to modernize and belong to
the league of civilized nations. This message continues to be
delivered in Turkey today. In fact, for every child in Turkish
schools, education begins with learning the six Kemalist princi-
ples: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, revolution-
ism and secularism. 2 These principles and all other reforms of
t Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School. I would like to thank Professor
William Nelson for his invaluable guidance and support for this paper. I would
also like to thank Professor Vincenzo Varano for his comments, and my friend,
Sasha Govindacharya Rao for her tireless editorial efforts. I would also like to
thank the editors at the Pace International Law Review, especially Nicole Feit and
Noelle Picone.
1 SADI BoRAK, ATATURK VE DIN [ATATURK AND RELIGION] 7 (Toplumsal
Donusum) (2002).
2 These principles are discussed in depth in the nationally used elementary
school book on Turkish revolutionary history. See generally NESET CAGATAY &
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the Kemalist Revolution are incorporated into the Preamble of
the Turkish Constitution. In particular, Article 174 of the Con-
stitution mandates: "No provision of the Constitution shall be
construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Re-
form laws ... which aim to raise Turkish society above the level
of contemporary civilization and to safeguard the secular char-
acter of the Republic."3
After their victory in the independence war against the oc-
cupying European powers at the end of World War I, the
Kemalist nation-building elite emphasized the revolutionary
nature of their project.4 The Kemalists changed the nature of
governance from monarchy to democratic republic, and admin-
istered reforms to systematically change the very meaning of
what it meant to be a "Turk." Given that the Ottoman Empire
was socially, politically and legally defined by Islam, its official
religion, the Kemalist elite found one of the core definitions of
its character in denouncing religion as a source of social, politi-
cal, economic and legal organization. The Kemalist revolu-
tionaries wanted the new Turkish nation to be a democratic
republic, free of religion.
Today, Turkish students, from first grade until senior year
in college, have a mandatory course on the revolutionary his-
tory of Turkey. In the first grade textbook, used nation-wide,
the Kemalist principle of revolutionism is defined as follows:
"Revolutionism is to demolish the institutions that have left the
Turkish nation in a backward state, and to build new institu-
tions that will enable the nation to evolve according to the re-
quirements of civilization."5
From a student's first school textbook to the highest law
of the land, the Constitution, Turks are taught that the Kema-
list Revolution was a complete and clear break with their Is-
lamic Ottoman past. As explained below, however, this alleged
MUHSIN KAYA, TuRKIYE CUMHURIYETI INKILAP TARIHI VE ATATURKCULUK [TURKISH
REPUBLIC'S REVOLUTIONARY HISTORY AND KEMALISM] (1998).
3 Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi [Constitution] (Turk.) [hereinafter TURK-
ISH CONSTITUTION]. The official English translation of Turkey's Constitution is
available at http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ (follow "The Constitution of the Republic of
Turkey" hyperlink).
4 See NiVAzi BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 431-78(1998), for a general discussion of the Kemalist nation-building project.
5 CAGATAY & KAYA, supra note 2, at 202.
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"break" is complicated in two major ways. First, some Kemalist
reforms, especially the legal ones, were a continuation of earlier
Ottoman reforms. Second, the Revolution was not so revolu-
tionary in certain respects. Although the Kemalist Revolution
changed many significant aspects of Turkish life, ghosts of be-
liefs, norms and laws of the past continue to lurk in present-day
Turkey, as evidenced by the evolution and the current sub-
stance of Turkish family law.
The following analysis of family law provisions contained in
the Turkish Civil Codes, past and present, demonstrates that
although significant progress has been made toward gender
equality, certain Islamic laws dealing with female sexuality
survive in their entirety, and in contradiction to the general
spirit of gender egalitarianism of the codes. This is not anoma-
lous considering that revolutions often have failed to completely
eradicate the past. 6
6 In the Chinese case, although the Communist Revolution radically altered
many aspects of Chinese life, some cultural features, such as family structure,
have survived to this day. See generally Janice A. Lee, Family Law of the Two
Chinas: A Comparative Look at the Rights of Married Women in the People's Re-
public of China and the Republic of China, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217
(1997) (discussing how Confucian values on family and gender relations still per-
sist despite the revolutionary efforts). See generally Wallace Johnson, Symposium
on Ancient, Law, Economics & Society Part II: Ancient Rights and Wrongs: Status
and Liability for Punishment in the Tang Code, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 217 (1995)
(arguing that the Tang Code of 653 still informs current Chinese criminal law on
issues such as trial procedure and emphasis on confession); Pamella A. Seay, Law,
Crime, and Punishment in the People's Republic of China: A Comparative Intro-
duction to the Criminal Justice and Legal System of the People's Republic of China,
9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143 (1998) (arguing that the Confucian concepts have
survived in Chinese culture to this day and continue to influence the evolution of
Chinese law); Robert Bejesky, Political Pluralism and Its Institutional Impact on
Criminal Procedure Protections in China: A Philosophical Evolution from "Li" to
"Fa" and from "Collectivism" to "Individualism," 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2002) ("traditional cultural influences remain strong in China today [and
they] currently provide a framework for societal conduct that survived turbulent,
revolutionary, and chaotic moments..."); PHILLIP M. CHEN, LAW AND JUSTICE: THE
LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 2400 B.C. TO 1960 A.D. (1973) (arguing that underlying
notions of justice, such as communal application of justice and reliance on small
community leaders rather than official authority, have survived the Maoist revolu-
tion). See CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION (1965), for a similar
discussion on the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Brinton argues
that in revolutions, including the Bolshevik Revolution, "some institutions, some
laws, even some human habits ... clearly changed in very important ways; other
institutions, laws, and habits... changed in the long run but slightly, if at all." Id.
at 237. He specifically points out that despite the reforms legalizing abortion and
2005]
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To situate the Kemalist Revolution among others of its
kind, in Part II, I look at the Ottoman Empire on the eve of
World War I. I focus specifically on the Tanzimat period (1839-
1878) when certain reforms were introduced in an effort to mod-
ernize some Ottoman institutions. Then I briefly look at the
codified personal laws of 1917, the Mecelle. In Part III, I ana-
lyze the period immediately following World War I. I look at
reforms introduced in this period, focusing specifically on those
aimed at eradicating religious influence on everyday life. In
Part IV, I discuss the Civil Code of 1926 (hereinafter "1926
Code"), adapted from the Swiss Civil Code of 1889. I discuss the
changes instituted by the 1926 Code, comparing them with the
preceding era. In particular, I show that the 1926 Code re-
tained certain principles of Islamic family law.
In Part V, I discuss legislative attempts to reform the 1926
Code, ultimately leading up to the realization of the new civil
code, which took effect on January 1, 2002 (hereinafter "2002
Code"). The new code introduced significant changes towards
gender equality in marriage because individual freedom and
gender equality were main concerns of the drafters. Neverthe-
less, the same Islamic law concepts in the 1926 Code survive
unchallenged in the 2002 Code.
In the conclusion, I argue that while the Kemalist Revolu-
tion and its reforms have significantly altered the everyday re-
ality of Turks, the current code still carries Islamic remnants
from a time considered long gone. The 2002 Code's unquestion-
ing acceptance of inequalities arising from perceived gender
differences rooted in Islamic law shows that at least some
Kemalist reforms are not as revolutionary as have been ac-
cepted.7 Both the proponents and the opponents of the Kemal-
making divorce almost effortless, sexual norms were not drastically altered. He
asserts that "the Christian monogamous family has survived the old Bolsheviks inRussia." Id. at 245. See generally HEDRICK SMITH, THE NEW RUSSIANS (1991), for adiscussion on how some aspects of life remained the same in the Russian and Cen-
tral Asian parts of the Soviet Union.
7 Here, I do not make the argument that Islam inherently leads to genderinequality. Rather, Islamic law as it has developed through jurisprudence has led
to legal precepts, some of which result in gender injustice. For a critical inquiry on
the development of Islamic law see generally KHALED ABou EL FADL, SPEAKING INGOD'S NAME: ISLAMIC LAw, AUTHORITY AND WOMEN (2001). See also AsMA BARLAs,
BELIEVING WOMEN IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THEQuRAN (2002).
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ist Revolution and its reforms have accepted the premise that
there is a clear and undeniable break between the Ottoman
period, when religion dictated law, and the secular Turkish Re-
public period, where only nationalism, modernity and rational-
ism based on liberal democratic principles dictate law. This
paper shows that the lines between the past and the present,
the old and the new, the depth and reality of change pre and
post-revolution are not as clear or definite as the Kemalist hege-
monic narratives may suggest.
II. MODERNIZATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic empire. The Ottoman
emperors derived their power and legitimacy from religion and
justified their invasions by religious mandates." The Ottoman
legal system, based on the Islamic law, the Sharia, was central-
ized. In the Ottoman Empire, Islamic judges became state em-
ployees and the office of the Sheikh-al-Islam was founded. The
Sheikh-al-Islam was the chief judge and Islamic scholar who
consulted with the Ottoman emperor on the legality of matters.
9
The Sharia consisted of provisions listed in the Quran, Islam's
holy book, sayings and acts of Prophet Mohammed as reported
through the centuries, and the interpretations of Islamic jurists
over the centuries, often in the form of treatises. Although the
Sharia covered most areas of personal relations, a centralized
state required more expansive and detailed laws in other areas
of life. Thus, the Ottoman state created another kind of law,
qanun, mainly introducing agrarian and criminal regulations
where the Sharia was silent.10
Qanun was unmistakably positive law, though it could not
contradict Islamic principles." Although the concept of positive
law was a revolutionary concept, qanun had a diminished effect
because it was consistent with, and inclusive of, Islamic princi-
ples. Moreover, "qanun penalties were rarely if ever applied."'
2
8 See generally HAIM GERBER, IsLAMic LAW AND CULTURE: 1600-1840, 50-54
(1999), for a discussion of law in the Ottoman Empire. See also TURGUT AKPINAR,
TURKLER'IN DIN VE HUKUK TARIHI [TURKS' HISTORY OF RELIGION AND LAW] 181-215
(1999).
9 See GERBER, supra note 8, at 18.
10 See id. at 29; see also AKPINAR, supra note 8, at 184-85.
11 See AKPINAR, supra note 8, at 184-85.
12 GERBER, supra note 8, at 29.
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Regardless of the substance of qanun, the very existence of
a law not directly derived from the Sharia was very important
for further reforms in the period following the mid-nineteenth
century. Significantly, the early nineteenth century was "the
last historical moment when the traditional Islamic legal sys-
tem may be said to have been still undiluted by Western cul-
tural penetration."13 By the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman
intellectuals had begun to engage with Western intellectual
ideas, most notably those on democracy and secularism.14
These engagements coincided with the continuing decline of Ot-
toman power and the continuing rise of Western European em-
pires. The Ottoman state apparatus needed to be reformed and
updated in order to compete with Western Europe. The West-
ern ideological influence, coupled with the demands of the Otto-
man reality, led to Western-influenced reforms during the
Tanzimat period. 15
The main instrument of the Tanzimat reforms was the
Gulhane Charter, a written code applicable to all subjects of the
Empire. The Gulhane Charter was revolutionary because it
made no distinction between the Muslim and the non-Muslim
subjects of the Empire.16 The reforms introduced with the
Gulhane Charter aimed to reform the military, the educational
system and other failing state apparatuses, but could not con-
tradict Islamic principles. 17 Despite its substantive reformative
character, the main significance of the Gulhane Charter was its
codified nature, its treatment of all subjects alike, and its will-
ingness to construct a non-religious legal space.' 8 This new
realm opened by the Tanzimat spirit led to further legal re-
forms, mainly evidenced in codification efforts.
Codification was a major instrument in legal reform. The
act of codifying existing laws involves a process of selection, and
13 GERBER, supra note 8, at 1.
14 SERIF MARDIN, THE GENESIS OF YOUNG OTroMAN THOUGHT 8-9 (2000).
15 See BERKES, supra note 4, at 137-44. Berkes also adds that although Euro-
pean powers had no direct advisory role in reforms at this point, they were instru-
mental in pushing for reforms in their advocacy of Christian minorities in the
Ottoman Empire. See id. at 143-44.16 See id. at 145. See also MARDIN, supra note 14, at 154-68 (discussing the
individuals behind the Gulhane Charter, the political dynamics leading to its en-
actment, and international reactions to the new law).
17 Id.
18 Id.
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consequently, eradication of laws. When the existing laws are
religious, the codification process increases and highlights the
positive nature of the new codified law. 19 In other words, codifi-
cation is a secular act. The Tanzimat era efforts of codification
involved this level of secularism. 20
The move toward a secular outlook was especially relevant
in the drafting of the first civil code, the Mecelle. Even though
the Ottoman lawmakers accepted foreign sources in other areas
- like the commercial code based on its French counterpart of
1807 - they insisted on a civil code based on the Sharia.21 Thus,
the Mecelle was drafted based on Hanafi jurisprudence, one of
four main Sunni Islamic schools of law.22 Consequently, the Ot-
toman state affiliation with the Hanafi school of Islamic law
was also codified. 23 This attempt to shift the boundaries of re-
ligious and secular law did not find favor with the Sheikh-al-
Islam, and he persuaded the Ottoman Sultan to disband the
commission drafting the civil code. 24 The commercial law por-
tion of the code, however, had already been completed and went
into effect. To administer these new codes, new secular courts
were established. These courts followed new procedural guide-
lines, such as accepting testimony from non-Muslim witnes-
ses.
25
There was significant resistance within the Ottoman Em-
pire to modernization efforts and the secularization reforms
19 Id.
20 See BERKES, supra note 4, at 160-69.
21 Id.
22 See BERKES, supra note 4, at 168. It is noteworthy that Cevdet Pasha, the
main proponent and the architect of the Mecelle, found support for codification of
civil relations and establishment of secular courts in an Islamic law treatise writ-
ten by Jalal al-Din Dawwani. See id. at 165-66. Dawwani argued that "secular
courts were not only compatible with Islam but also were necessary to it." Id. at
165.
23 See id. at 165-66, 168. The Ottoman state had always preferred the Hanafi
school of law for its flexibility in allowing for a centralized state system. However,
because the court system was not centralized, the judges had considerable flexibil-
ity to apply alternative theories. See generally GERBER, supra note 8 (discussing
the flexibility of the use of various schools of Islamic law). Through an analysis of
four different judges in different parts of the Ottoman Empire during a time span
of almost two and a half centuries, Gerber shows that the state's dictate of one
school of law was not rigidly applied in practice. See id. at 25-28.
24 See Deniz Kandiyoti, End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism and Women in
Turkey, in WOMEN, ISLAM AND THE STATE 27 (1991).
25 See BERKES, supra note 4, at 162.
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during the Tanzimat era.2 6 The Islamists resented the secular
nature of the reforms, as well as the authoritarian manner in
which they were implemented. 27 Others believed the reforms
had to be accompanied by democratization efforts, because
westernizing reforms brought with them the ideals of national-
ism and democratic governance. 28 After a short-lived attempt
at a constitutional monarchy (1876-1878), the Ottoman state
continued to implement reforms in the midst of an authorita-
rian regime. 29 This led to the revolutionary overthrow in 1908
of the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhamit II, by the Young Turks
movement. 30 A new era of constitutional monarchy began.31
Though in an era of reform, the Ottoman Empire was still
an Islamic state, the office of the Sheik-al-Islam continued, and
the Islamists became one of the main political circles that influ-
enced policy and law.32 The other two main circles were the
Turkish nationalists and the Ottomanists. Each group hoped
the constitution would help their own goals. In this atmos-
phere, the issue of a codified civil law was revisited, and talk of
reinstating the Mecelle committee began in the early days of the
1908 Revolution.33 However, the new family law did not come
into existence until 1917 due to disagreements over whether
family law could be codified, whether all schools of Islamic law
could be included in the code, and whether any or all of these
suggestions were un-Islamic and thus a threat to the core of the
Ottoman Empire. 34
Until 1917, family law continued to be administered under
the authority of religious courts. There were, however, changes
within the parameters of Islamic law. In 1915, divorce law was
modified by two imperial edicts. 35 Accordingly, women could
now sue for divorce "in cases of desertion or the existence of a
26 See Kandiyoti, supra note 24, at 24-28 (discussing the reactions to legal
reforms during Tanzimat).
27 See generally BERKES, supra note 4.
28 Id.
29 Kandiyoti, supra note 24, at 24-28.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 28.
32 See BERKES, supra note 4 at 367-77.
33 Id.
34 Id.; see also Kandiyoti, supra note 24, at 27.
35 See JOHN L. ESPOSITO & NATANA J. DELONG-BAs, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAM-
ILY LAW 51 (2d ed. 2001).
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husband's contagious disease making conjugal life danger-
ous." 36 Although these changes constituted a departure from
the traditional Hanafi jurisprudence, they were in harmony
with the potential grounds of divorce available to women under
other schools of Islamic law.3 7
Continued discussion of women's social status and the real-
ities of World War I led to the reinstatement of the committee
working on the family law part of the Mecelle in 1916.38 The
Law of Family Rights was enacted in 1917, and became a part
of the Mecelle.39 Although derived from Islamic family law, the
new code brought significant changes, especially in the area of
divorce. The husband's absolute right to divorce and polygamy
was curtailed. 40 In addition, for the first time, the personal
laws of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were codified in this fam-
ily law. Due to strong objections, however, provisions applying
to non-Muslims were abrogated in 1919. 4 1
PART III. TURKISH REPUBLIC AND KEMALIST REFORMS
After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the new republic,
led by Mustafa Kemal, was declared in 1923. A new parliamen-
tary system, with representatives of the people, was formed. A
series of reforms aimed at transforming the newly conceptual-
ized Turkish society at all levels followed. 42
The Kemalist reforms changed the relationship between re-
ligion and the state in two main ways: they eliminated or
banned institutions of Islamic influence, such as the Caliph
43
and Islamic brotherhoods, and they placed all main Islamic in-
stitutions, including the mosques, under government control.
44
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 See SERAFErrIN TURAN, TURK DEVRIM TARIHI III: YENI TURKIYE'NIN
OLUSUMU [TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY HISTORY] 218 (1995).
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 TURAN, supra, note 38.
42 See id.
43 The office of the Caliph, the leader of the Sunni Muslim community.
44 To this day, government control of religion has been established mainly by
the Office of Chief of Religious Affairs, which operates under the Office of the
Prime Minister. This office is in charge of certifying and appointing religious per-
sonnel, overseeing the performance of their duties and paying their salary from the
treasury. See generally http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default.asp.
2005]
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The Kemalist reforms also centralized education, thereby elimi-
nating any religious influence that could be disseminated
through educational institutions.45 Thus, law was the main tool
of the Kemalist Revolution.
The early Kemalist reforms of 1924 abolished the positions
of the Caliph and Sheikh-al-Islam and shut down the religious
courts. A year later, in 1925, centers for Sufi orders were shut
down. 46 That same year, a new law prohibited the use of fez
and other items of Ottoman male clothing and mandated the
use of European style hats.4 7 In 1926, the Christian calendar
replaced the Islamic one. Finally, in 1928, the Arabic alphabet
used throughout the Ottoman era was replaced with a modified
Latin alphabet in 1928.48
Legal reform was the central mechanism of the Kemalist
Revolution, and codification was the main method of legal re-
form. The Constitution, first enacted in 1921, was revised in
1924. It was accompanied by the adoption and adaptation of
various European codes. For instance, in 1929, the Code of Exe-
cution and Bankruptcy was adopted, based on the Swiss Fed-
eral Code of 1889. 49 The Italian Criminal Code of 1889 became
the basis for the Criminal Code of 1926. The Swiss Civil Code
and the Code of Obligations were adopted in 1926 as the new
uniform civil code of the new republic.50 To promote the new
law and introduce the new tradition of the non-religious civil
marriage, an accompanying law was passed mandating that the
45 See Act No. 430 of 3 Mar. 1340 (1924) on the Unification of the Educational
System cited in TURKISH CONSTITUTION art. 174. Accordingly, even courses teach-
ing the Quran are under government supervision.
46 Sufi orders are known as the mystical branches of Islam. See Act No. 677 of
30 Nov. 1341 (1925) on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, The Aboli-
tion of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain
Titles cited in TURKISH CONSTITUTION art. 174.
47 See Act No. 671 of 25 Nov. 1341 (1925) on the Wearing of Hats cited in
TURKISH CONSTITUTION art. 174.
48 See Act No. 1353 of 1 Nov. 1928 (1928) on the Adoption and Application of
the Turkish Alphabet cited in TURKISH CONSTITUTION art. 174. See also Nilufer
Gole, Modernist Kamusal Alan ve Islami Ahlak [Modernist Public Space and Is-
lamic Morality], in ISLAM'IN YENI KAMUsAL YUZLERI [NEW PUBLIC FACES OF ISLAM]
23 (2000) (discussing the Kemalist reforms).
49 See Adnan Guriz, Sources of Turkish Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH
LAW 1, 9 (T. Ansay & D. Wallace eds.) (1996).
50 See id.
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marriage ceremony be conducted before a competent official. 51
Furthermore, women gained the right to vote and hold office in
municipal elections in 1930 and in national elections in 1934.52
PART IV. 1926 CrVIL CODE: TURK KANUNU MEDENISI
During the Kemalist Revolution, legal reform once again
took the form of codification. The Swiss Civil Code was selected
as the "best fit" for the Turkish society.5 3 Moreover, although
the Swiss Civil Code was kept intact in form, some provisions
were substantively modified in accord with the Turkish reality
of 1926. Although the new nation was referred to as Turkish, it
was the Ottoman reality based on religious identity that gov-
erned people's daily lives. Religion did not become less impor-
tant in people's lives simply because the Revolution was hard at
work to eradicate it.
It is undeniable that the 1926 Code brought about some
revolutionary changes, especially in the area of family law. The
age of consent for girls was changed from nine under Islamic
law to fifteen. Similarly, for boys, it was changed from eleven to
seventeen. 54 Perhaps one of the most significant articles of the
1926 Code was the abrogation of polygamy, permitted under Is-
lamic law.55 Article 93 required that any person seeking to
marry must prove that any prior marriage had ended. 56 Moreo-
ver, under Article 112(1), a marriage would be void if either of
the spouses were married at the time of entry into marriage.
57
The 1926 Code also brought significant changes in divorce
law. Both spouses were given equal entitlement to divorce, and
51 See TURK KANUNU MEDENISI [CIv. CODE 1926] (Turk.) also cited in TURKISH
CONSTITUTION art. 174 (number 4). Under the Turkish Constitution, one of the re-
forms that cannot be modified by any interpretation is "[t]he principle of civil mar-
riage according to which the marriage act shall be concluded in the presence of a
competent official, adopted with the Turkish Civil Code. Act No. 743 of 17 Feb.
1926, and Article 110 of the Code." TURKISH CONSTITUTION art. 174.
52 See Binnaz Toprak, Dinci Sag [Religious Right], in GECIS SURECINDE
TURKIYE [TURKEY IN TRANSITION] 237-55 (1992).
53 See generally, Turk Medeni Kanunu Genel Gerekce (Turkish Civil Code,
The General Justification), http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/gerekce
1926.html.
54 See Crv. CODE 1926, available at http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/743.13.text.
asp.
55 See Crv. CODE 1926 art. 93.
56 Id.
57 See Crv. CODE 1926 art. 112(1).
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the grounds for divorce became the same for both spouses. 58 Ac-
cordingly, the husband's absolute right to divorce was abro-
gated by allowing for divorce only through the judicial system
and based on the enumerated grounds.
Despite the significant changes brought about by the 1926
Code, one of the reasons for its acceptance was that it did not
drastically change certain aspects of family law. This was not,
however, explicitly acknowledged by the Kemalists. The state
rhetoric was that the 1926 Code was a symbol of westerniza-
tion, the latest of its kind in Europe, and thus proof that Turkey
was on its way to becoming a member of the "civilized" world.
This rationale is explicit in "the General Justification for
the Proposed Law," written by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the Jus-
tice Minister of the time.59 Bozkurt argued that the Mecelle,
based on the Sharia had to be abandoned in favor of a new law,
because laws based on religion were inherently rigid, immuta-
ble, stagnant and incapable of meeting the changing needs of
society. Depriving the new Turkish Republic of the legal ad-
vances of modern civilization could not be reconciled with the
goals of the Turkish Revolution.60 Bozkurt gave an overview of
the evolution of the German, French and Swiss civil codes, and
concluded that fundamental to all these laws was the absolute
separation of religion and state. He explained that the drafting
commission selected the Swiss Civil Code because it could easily
adapt to a new society, and had brought together various can-
tons with different customs and traditions. Moreover, the Swiss
Code was the latest of its kind in Europe.61 Thus, Bozkurt con-
cluded, when the new Turkish Civil Code was enacted, the
Turkish nation would be "freed of thirteen centuries of ill beliefs
and chaos, close the doors of an old civilization, and enter the
modern civilization which [would] bring it life and prosperity."62
58 See id. art. 129-50, for provisions on divorce (Section Four of the Code ad-
dresses divorce). See id. art. 129-34, for grounds for divorce specifically.
59 Turk Medeni Kanunu Genel Gerekce [General Justification of the Turkish
Civil Code], BELGENET, Oct. 24. 2001, available at http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/
medenikanun/gerekce_1926.html (website contains the entire speech presented
during a Turkish Parliamentary debate on the proposed Turkish Civil Code of
1926).
60 See id. at 2.
61 See id. at 4.
62 Id. at 5.
[Vol. 17:347
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/8
AFTERMATH OF A REVOLUTION
The official rhetoric that the 1926 code was a complete
break with the Islamic past, however, failed to match the sub-
stance of the law. Certain provisions of the 1926 Code were
harmonious with Islamic legal concepts. For instance, the
grounds for divorce provided by the 1926 Code were adultery,
63
life threatening or psychologically destructive behavior,
64 crimi-
nal behavior, 65 abandonment, 66 mental illness,67 and irrepara-
ble damage to the marriage union.68 These grounds are quite
similar to those available to a woman according to some inter-
pretations of Islamic law. Moreover, they are also reminiscent
of the grounds provided in the Mecelle, according to which a
woman could divorce her husband "if he was unable to consum-
mate the marriage, was missing, refused to pay her mainte-
nance . . . suffered from venereal disease . . . or went insane
after the marriage."6 9
The 1926 Code also kept intact the patriarchal family
structure. Accordingly, the husband was the head of the fam-
ily,70 and his last name became the family name.7 1 He repre-
sented the family union 72 and was responsible for the wife.
73
The wife's right to work outside the home was subject to the
husband's permission. Alternatively, the wife could seek such
permission from the courts. 74 Articles 155 through 160 specifi-
cally, and the 1926 Code generally, set up a system whereby the
husband had a duty to protect the wife, both in her finances and
her social interests, as her main legal representative, and the
wife had a right to demand such protection. This brings to mind
a verse from the Quran: "Men are the full maintainers of wo-
men . . . because men spend out of their wealth on them."
7 5
63 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 129.
64 See id. art. 130.
65 See id. art. 131.
66 See id. art. 132.
67 See id. art. 133.
68 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 134.
69 ESPOSITO & DELONG-BAs, supra note 35, at 51.
70 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 152.
71 See id. art. 153.
72 See CiV. CODE 1926 art. 154.
73 See id. art. 155.
74 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 159.
75 QuRAN, ch. IV, verse 34, as explained by Allamah Nooruddin, in AMATUL-
LAH RAHMAT OMAR & ABDUL MANNAN OMAR, TRANSLATORS 85-86 (2003).
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All types of property entering the family unit came under
the control and management of the husband.7 6 This is not to
suggest that the woman did not retain property rights. Rather,
the law spoke only of maintaining the property, in harmony
with the husband's general duty to protect his wife's interests.7 7
Moreover, the 1926 Code set up an ownership system within the
marriage very similar to Islamic law. Even though the Swiss
Civil Code recognized a system of shared property, the 1926
Code changed this to recognize a property regime whereby each
spouse retained what he or she brought into the marriage.78
Under Article 146, upon divorce, both parties keep what they
bring into the marriage.7 9 The rest of the property was shared
as specified in the marriage contract.
Although official statements of the Kemalists suggested
otherwise, the above examples show that not all the provisions
of the 1926 Code were drastically different from the previous
law. In reality, the 1926 Code held on to tenets of Islamic law in
other ways. For example, if one examines the language of the
code, Islamic legal concepts reveal their presence in the Arabic
terms which entered the Turkish language through Islamic law.
For instance, in the 1926 Code adultery was still referred to as
zina, the Islamic term for illicit sex, and alimony was referred
to as nafaka, from the Islamic term, nafaqa, for maintenance.8 0
Another similarity between the 1926 Code and Islamic Law
was the amount of authority granted to a judge. Under Islamic
law, the judge decided each case based on the primary sources,
the Quran and the collections of the Prophet Mohammed's say-
ings and acts, as well as previous interpretations by the ju-
rists.8 ' Thus, the judge had considerable power to interpret the
76 See CiV. CODE 1926 art. 196, 212.
77 See id.
78 See "Turk Medeni Kanunu Genel Gerekce" [General Justification of the
Turkish Civil Code], BELGENET, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.belgenet.
com/yasa/medenikanun/gerekce.html (website contains the entire speech
presented during a Turkish Parliamentary debate on the proposed Turkish Civil
Code of 2002).
79 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 146.
80 See CIv. CODE 1926 art. 129, 144-45. The term zina is included in Article
129, and the term nafaka is included in articles 144-45.
81 See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC
LAw (2005), for a discussion on a judge's authority under Islamic law.
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law and apply it to the facts of each case.8 2 The adaptation of
the Swiss Civil Code made it possible to keep this system of ju-
dicial lawmaking intact. Article 1 of the 1926 Code allowed the
judge to consult custom and tradition where there is no written
law on point.8 3 Where there was also no related custom or tra-
dition on point, the judge was then permitted to consider the
legislative intent. The judge could also consult scientific opin-
ions and previous decisions. In other words, the civil judge of
the Turkish Republic had authority very similar to the judge in
the Islamic courts of the Ottoman Empire.
Besides the provisions and characteristics that resembled
the denounced Islamic past, some provisions of the 1926 Code
kept certain Islamic legal concepts very much the same as
before. For instance, Article 95 provided:
A woman who is a widow due to her husband's passing, divorce or
the annulment of her marriage, cannot remarry for 300 days fol-
lowing the passing of the husband, divorce, or the annulment de-
cree. The period ends if and when the woman gives birth. The
judge can shorten the period if it is established that the woman
cannot get pregnant, or in the case of divorce, husband and wife
wish to remarry each other.8 4
CIv. CODE 1926 art. 95.
This waiting period related directly to Article 241 which
provided that any child born during the marriage or within
three hundred days following divorce was deemed to be fathered
by the husband.8 5
The divorced man faced no similar prohibitions on re-mar-
riage. The waiting period imposed solely on the divorced wo-
man shows the concern determining paternity. The language
of Article 95 leaves no doubt that the concern is with whether
the woman is pregnant, and determining the paternity of the
offspring.8 6 This concern with determining fatherhood and the
need to avoid leaving the determination to the mother is the
same as Islamic law's concern with determining paternal line-
82 Id.
83 CIV. CODE 1926 art. 1.
84 The quotes from the Turkish codes are the author's translation.
85 See CIv. CODE 1926 art. 241.
86 See id. art. 95.
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age. In fact, all schools of Islamic law require that a divorced
woman be kept in seclusion for a period of time, referred to as
iddah, usually three menstrual cycles, after the divorce.87 Sim-
ilar to Article 95, the main purpose of this law is to determine if
the woman is pregnant with the ex-husband's child.88
Although the 1926 Code maintained the Islamic concept of
the waiting period, it refused to punish its violation. Article 122
stated that a marriage was not void for violating the waiting
period.8 9 That the law required a waiting period for the woman
but did not punish its violation shows the dilemma of a legal
revolution that attempted to adopt foreign laws while trying to
maintain social norms informed by religion.
Also related to the determination of paternity is Article
243, which states that any child born at least one-hundred and
eighty days after the marriage was deemed to be the husband's,
unless he would prove otherwise. 9o Moreover, under Article
244, if a child was born in less than one hundred and eighty
days after marriage, the husband could refuse paternity with-
out further proof.91 Similarly, under Islamic law, a child born
after six months of marriage is deemed to be the husband's, un-
less otherwise proven, and a child born in less then six months
of marriage is considered not to be the husband's, as a matter of
law. 9
2
One could argue that in the world of the 1920's, women
were generally under male hegemony and that it should not be
surprising that even a code from a "progressive" and "civilized"
society of Western Europe would not allow for the kind of gen-
der egalitarianism we aspire to today. However, the Turkish
nation-building elite specifically selected the Swiss Civil Code.
There were a few reasons for this decision, stated in the Justifi-
cation for the 1926 Civil Code. First, Switzerland was a multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural society. If a civil code governing the
daily affairs of citizens worked well in such a multi-cultural so-
87 See ESPOSITO & DELONO-BAs, supra note 35, at 20-21.
88 See id. See also AHMAD IBN NAQIB AL-MISRI, RELIANCE OF THE TRAVELLER
A CLASSIC MANUAL OF ISLAMIC SACRED LAw 566-71 (1994) (for a discussion on the
iddah period).
89 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 122.
90 See Civ. CODE 1926 art. 243.
91 See id. art. 244.
92 See AL-MIsRI, supra note 88, at 572.
[Vol. 17:347
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/8
AFTERMATH OF A REVOLUTION
ciety, it would certainly work well in the mainly homogenous
Turkish Republic.93 Moreover, the Swiss Civil Code was the
"newest" and "the most advanced" civil code available. 94 These
reasons were at best vague in that there was never any expla-
nation of which parts of the Swiss Civil Code were better suita-
ble to the new Turkish Nation than those of other available civil
codes.
Regardless of what the actual reasons for choosing the
Swiss Civil Code were, this choice allowed the nation building
elite to convince the representatives of the people to accept the
new law. The reality facing the nation building elite was a cli-
mate where even the most anti-Islamic minded reformists had
to negotiate with the representatives of a people who very much
defined themselves around their religion. Thus, the Swiss Civil
Code was selected and modified. As the selected model, the
Swiss Civil Code allowed the state to keep judicial authority in
personal matters. Certain provisions were inserted into the law
so as to synchronize the law with mass conceptions about sexu-
ality, its control and institutionalization in marriage and di-
vorce. Although entry into and exit out of marriage were made
equally accessible to both sexes, subtle provisions kept the wife
in her previous position under Ottoman Islamic law when it
came to dealing with other men, or controlling her womb.
PART V. 2002 CIVIL CODE: TURK MEDENI KANUNU
A. Reform Attempts
The 1926 Code was amended fifteen times after its enact-
ment, and six of its provisions were abrogated. 95 Some of these
changes arose from efforts to remedy gender inequalities in the
Code. For instance, Article 153, mandating that the woman
take her husband's family name, was amended so that the wo-
man could use her maiden name before her husband's family
93 See "Turk Medeni Kanunu Genel Gerekce" [General Justification of the
Turkish Civil Code], BELGENET, 2, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.belgenet.
comlyasa/medenikanun/gerekce.html (website contains the entire speech
presented during a Turkish Parliamentary debate on the proposed Turkish Civil
Code of 2002). It is not clear on which statistic the claim of homogeneity was based.
94 Id. at 3.
95 See Civ. CODE 1926. These changes are listed at the end of the 1926 Civil
Code.
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name. 96 Moreover, Article 159, which required that the wife re-
ceive her husband's permission to work outside the home, was
abrogated.97
Long before these significant changes, however, the need to
revise the 1926 Code was debated. As early as 1951, a revision
commission was formed. 98 This effort, like its successors in
1971, 1974, 1976, and 1984, did not receive parliamentary ap-
proval. 99 The drafting effort that led to the current civil code
began in 1994. A new draft was completed by 1998, and it re-
ceived approval through the various parts of the Turkish law-
making mechanism. The General Assembly of the Turkish Par-
liament began discussions on the proposed law on October 24,
2001.100
The proposed law was to replace the 1926 Code. The Gen-
eral Justification for the Proposed Law (hereinafter "the Justifi-
cation") incorporated the Justification for the 1926 Code in its
entirety.101 The language was revised to replace Arabic words
for Islamic terms with Turkish equivalents. The majority of the
proposed changes were in the area of family law, aiming to
bring further gender equality.102
The Justification focuses on the linguistic changes. In par-
ticular, the Justification addresses changes that attempt to ac-
complish total equality of the spouses in the marriage
institution, as well as the married couple's proposed contractual
freedom of determining the system of marital property.
Throughout the Justification, there is a special and repeated
emphasis that the proposed code strives for complete gender
equality.
96 See Law No. 4248/1, 14/5/1997 (amendment to the Civ. CODE 1926).
97 See Turkish Constitutional Court Decision, E.1990/30, K.1990/31, 29/11/
1990; see also CIv. CODE 1926 art. 159.
98 See "Turk Medeni Kanunu Tarihcesi" [The History of the Turkish Civil
Code], BELGENET, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.belgenet.conmyasa/
medenikanun/tarihce.html.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See "Turk Medeni Kanunu Genel Gerekce" [General Justification of the
Turkish Civil Code], BELGENET, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.belgenet.
com/yasa/medenikanun/gerekce.html (website contains the entire speech
presented during a Turkish Parliamentary debate on the proposed Turkish Civil
Code of 2002).
102 See id.
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B. The New Civil Code: Mix of Gender Equality and
Threatening Female Sexuality
Under the new Civil Code of 2002 ("2002 Code"), the age of
consent is seventeen for both girls and boys. 10 3 In marriage,
spouses are equal in decision-making capacity and in their re-
sponsibility to make the marriage work.10 4 Each spouse is an
equal representative of the union to third parties. 0 5 In terms
of ownership within marriage, the married couple is free to con-
tractually choose a form of ownership as provided by the law.
Joint ownership is among the forms provided by the new
code. 10 6 Both spouses can initiate divorce based on the enumer-
ated grounds, which are the same as in the 1926 Code.
In short, the 2002 Code brings a considerable level of gen-
der equality to marriage. The husband is no longer the leader
or the representative of the family, as in the 1926 Code.' 0 7 The
wife retains all rights as to her property. Marriage is set up as
an institution of partnership of equals; rather than comple-
mentarily situated spouses. The husband is no longer the pro-
tector, and the wife no longer the protected. Moreover, the
married couple's freedom to select from various marital prop-
erty systems allows for spouses to best protect their interests in
case of divorce.' 08
Despite this significant move towards a more egalitarian
family law, the most obvious vestiges of Islamic law found in
the 1926 Code survive in the 2002 Code. Article 132 of the 2002
Code retains the waiting period imposed upon the divorced
woman:
If the marriage has ended, the woman cannot marry for three
hundred days starting from the end of the marriage. This period
may end when she gives birth. The court may lift this prohibition
103 See TURK MEDENI KANuNu [CIv. CODE 2002] art. 124 (Turk.), available at
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k47 2 1.html.
104 See id. art. 185-86.
105 See id. art. 189.
106 See id. art. 202. See id. art. 203-81(provides the various forms of ownership
and the provisions governing them).
107 Compare Civ. CODE. 1926 art. 152 (which states that"[tlhe husband is the
leader of the marriage union.") with Civ. CODE. 2002 art. 185-86, 189 (on the new
regime of equal spouses).
108 See CIv. CODE 2002 art. 202 (discussing the new property regime in the
marriage union).
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upon finding that the woman is not pregnant, or the divorced
spouses want to re-marry each other.
CIv. CODE 2002 art. 132.
Similar to the 1926 Code, under Article 154, if a woman
remarries during the prohibited time, the new marriage is not
void.109 Moreover, the articles on establishing or disputing pa-
ternity survive with no substantive changes.11o
Article 287 of the 2002 Code provides that "the child born at
least one hundred eighty days after the beginning of marriage,
and at most three hundred days after the divorce, is considered
to have entered the mother's womb within marriage."1 1' Thus,
the husband at the time is the father as a matter of law, unless
he can prove otherwise. With this provision, the new code com-
bines Articles 241 and 243 of the 1926 Code. It retains the pre-
sumption that the child born anytime from one hundred and
eighty days after marriage to three hundred days after divorce
is the husband's child. The 2002 Code, however, does not ex-
plicitly incorporate Article 244 of the 1926 Code, stating that
the husband can refuse paternity without proof if the child is
born in less than 180 days of marriage. 1 2 Thus, under the new
scheme, two Islamic law concepts from the 1926 Code survive
almost untouched: the one hundred and eighty-day presump-
tion concerning paternity and the concept of the waiting period
for the divorced woman.
In this age of technology where paternity can easily be de-
termined by medical tests, the aim of prohibiting a woman's re-
marriage for almost a year can only be explained by the
underlying presumptions of female sexuality in Islam. The fact
that the law recognizes and solidifies this prohibition, but ref-
uses to punish its violation, shows that the lawmakers recog-
nize the dated nature of the utility of these concepts. Yet, the
prohibitions and counting of days as determined centuries ago
remain a part of a family law otherwise concerned with gender
equality. The unspoken, and perhaps subconscious, underlying
109 See id. art. 154.
110 See id. art. 285-300.
M See id. art. 287.
112 See id. art. 287.
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logic seems to be that female sexuality is still questionable and
still has the potential to disrupt social order.
In all the discussions and debates surrounding the changes
in the new code, there is no mention of the provisions regulating
female sexuality and determination of paternity. In the parlia-
mentary debates on the law, fifteen representatives from six
parties from across the political spectrum shared their views.
113
The Justice Minister of the time, Hikmet Sami Turk, spoke on
the preparation and the substantive changes of the new law.
1 14
In his speech, Minister Turk emphasized the participation of
various women's rights groups in the drafting process." 5 Yet,
nowhere in any of the speeches or discussions was there a men-
tion of the articles on the waiting period for the woman, or the
provisions surrounding the determination of paternity.
To the contrary, the rhetoric of the 1926 Code is still clear
in the 2001 parliamentary discussions preceding the vote on the
proposed code. Not only was the justification for the 1926 Code
re-adopted in its entirety," 6 but its spirit was repeated by most
of the parliamentarians. For instance, Ali Arabaci of the
center-right Dogru Yol Party, proudly declared that "with its le-
gal revolution, the Turkish Republic decided to make a decisive
break from Islamic legal system."" 7 On the other hand, Rama-
zan Toprak of the Islamist AK Party objected to the rejection of
Islam and totality of Islamic principles as backward and uncivi-
lized. 1 8 Depending on their political positions, all the speakers
made statements along these dichotomous lines. All the speak-
ers agreed that the Kemalist Revolution had brought a clear
and complete break with the Islamic past, but they disagreed on
113 All speeches from the parliamentary debate are available at http://www.
belgenet.coml/yasa.
114 Adalet Bakani Hikmet Sami Turk'un Konusmasi, Justice Minister, Re-
marks from the TBMM Genel Kurulu Gorusmeleri, a Parliamentary Debate (Oct.
24, 2001) (transcript available at http:www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/
gorusme-8.html).
115 See id.
116 See supra note 101.
117 Ali Arabaci, Member of Dogru Yol Party, Remarks from the TBMM Genel
Kurulu Gorusmeleri: Ali Arabaci, a Parliamentary Debate (Oct. 24, 2001) (tran-
script available at http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/gorusme-
7
.html).
118 Ramazan Toprak, Member of the Islamist AK Party, Remarks from the
TBMM Genel Kurulu Gorusmeleri, a Parliamentary Debate (Oct. 21, 2001) (tran-
script available at http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/gorusme-1/html).
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whether this break was a historical accomplishment or a sad
mistake for which the Turkish Muslim masses continued to suf-
fer. 119 None of the speakers questioned the accuracy or the
completeness of this break with the Islamic past.
VI. CONCLUSION
Manfred Halpern argued "[i]t is no longer revolutionary to
suggest that we live in a revolutionary world."120 Yet the task
of defining revolution remains. This is partly because the
meaning of revolution shifts depending on time and place. One
way to seek the meaning of revolution is to question its aim.
Does a revolution aim to change the political and economic in-
stitutions? How significant should the change be to be revolu-
tionary? Can a revolution impact a society too deeply that even
the intimate individual relations change, perhaps to acquire
new meaning? Hannah Arendt argued that the modern concept
of revolution is "inextricably bound up with the notion that the
course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new
story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold
.. .. "121 The case of the Kemalist Revolution contradicts Ar-
endt's contention. Although the Kemalists claimed to tell an
entirely new story with their revolution, in fact only a part of
their story, albeit significant, was unique. The rest was simply
re-worded, and told in a new format, with a new voice.
Reforms in the Ottoman Empire significantly restricted the
sphere of Islamic law to family law. When the Kemalist Revolu-
tion declared the new Turkish Republic as a break from the Is-
lamic Ottoman Empire, there already existed a framework
within which the Kemalist reforms could take place. The
Kemalist reforms were unique in that they abolished Islamic
titles, such as the Caliph, Sheikh-al-Islam, and outlawed Is-
lamic centers of authority, such as brotherhoods. The might
and the importance of the legal revolution, however, were exag-
119 See the discussions preceding the parliamentary vote on the 2002 Civil
Code, http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/medenikanun/indexmk.html. The statements
of different members of the parties in the Turkish Parliament at the time are listed
at the bottom of the page under the heading TBMM GORUSMELERI (Oct. 24,
2001).
120 Manfred Halpern, The Revolution of Modernization in National and Inter-
national Society, in REVOLUTION 178-214 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1966).121 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 21 (1965).
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gerated at best. The codification of Islamic law, and the adop-
tion of western codes was already a part of the Ottoman legal
landscape. The only real resistance to change was in the area of
family law. As the adoption of the 1917 Law of Family Rights
indicates, even this resistance was weakening. After all, the
Ottoman legal system never depended solely on religious law,
as evidenced by the sphere of positive law, qanun, that existed
throughout most of the Empire's history.
Thus, the Kemalists came upon fertile ground of legal
evolution. The survival of the Kemalist Revolution depended on
the myth of the completely religious, and according to their nar-
rative, backward and unjust nature of the Ottoman past. By
dichotomizing the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in
all possible aspects, the Kemalists succeeded in constructing a
new Turkish identity, and justifying the systematic silencing of
any opposition to their reform projects. In this sense, the
Kemalist Revolution attempted to create the illusion of Arendt's
new story, never told or known before. Their main instrument
was the law, and specifically family law because that is the law
that remained Islamic in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the
Kemalists gave great importance to the Civil Code and the gen-
der equality it claimed to bring.
The Kemalist rhetoric, as is apparent in the speech of the
Justice Minister in 1926, was so powerful that generations of
Turkish citizens have lived believing it. This belief has led to
some changes, such as continuously striving to achieve a better
level of gender equality. 122 Dichotomous debates and political
agendas have formed around the rhetoric that Islam as a polit-
ico-legal system was left behind as part of a dark past. 123 These
debates have served the purpose of shifting the reality of Turk-
ish citizens in that current gender relations in Turkey are per-
haps better than they would have been had the citizens not
believed that their laws strive for egalitarianism. At the same
time, the myth of a complete break with Islam has also led to
authoritarian secular measures whereby the Turkish state has
122 See Gole, supra note 48, at 63-64.
123 See id. at 58-60.
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created and enforced prohibitive and, at times, oppressive laws
such as the ban on headcoverings in public space. 124
In this paper, I have traced the development and evolution
of laws governing the institutions of family, marriage and di-
vorce in Turkey. The laws have changed significantly from wo-
men having almost no access to divorce, to gender equality in
the family. Amidst these developments hide small vestiges of
the preceding era. These remnants survive in the family laws,
in the provisions still attempting to control the female body in
its reproductive capacity and its sexual potential. In the cor-
ners of the law, there still hides the presumption that by con-
trolling the determination of paternity, the woman can affect
economic ties, from maintenance of children to inheritance of
the man's property.
Today, outside of the former Soviet republics of Central
Asia and the Balkans, Turkey is the only majority Muslim coun-
try where family law is not based on the Sharia. The Kemalist
rhetoric has established and maintained a hegemony of knowl-
edge that claims a complete separation of religion and current
laws. Yet, a few provisions of Turkish family law show that pre-
sumptions from the past that lie in the deepest corners of the
social subconscious, in this case, those about female sexuality,
are the winners in the evolutionary scheme of surviving revolu-
tions. Despite the vast changes the Kemalist Revolution may
have brought, perhaps it has failed to even challenge the most
basic and problematic notions it claims to have eradicated.
Revolutions vary in character. They may be an expression
of the masses, the elite, an outside force, or even an interna-
tional intervention. Yet history has shown us that human will
is strong and expressions of human will can covertly, but might-
ily, resist even the most determined revolutions, from Turkey to
China. 125 This covert resistance may come in the form of armed
struggles, suicide bombings, peaceful protests, daily habitual
124 See generally NILUFER GOLE, THE FORBIDDEN MODERN: CIVILIZATION AND
VEILING (1996), for a discussion on the headcoverings in Turkey. See generally
MERVE KAvAKCI, BASORTUSUZ DEMOKRASI: TARIH ICINDE TARIH (2004)(For a discus-
sion on how the ban on headcoverings in Turkish public space affected a Turkish
woman. This is an autobiography of Merve Kavakci, the elected member of the
Turkish Parliament who, in 1999, was not allowed to take the Parliamentarian's
oath for refusing to remove her headscarf in the Parliament).
125 See supra note 6.
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practices in the privacy of the home, or in carefully hidden pro-
visions in a code defining the officially accepted parameters of
marriage and family. A nation-building project that aims to
radically alter the social, political, economic and legal landscape
of a people must recognize its limits to redefine and reconstruct
a brand new nation, or in Arendt's words, to write a brand new
story. After all, a good story is one that is true to its context,
and speaks to the reality of its audience.
25
